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EXPANDING (OR JUST FIXING) THE RESIDUAL 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE 
Daniel J. Capra* 
 
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (“the 
Committee”) has been considering whether to amend Federal Rule of 
Evidence 807 (known as the residual exception to the hearsay rule) to 
improve the way the Rule functions—and also to allow the admission of more 
hearsay if it is reliable.  At the conference sponsored by the Committee in 
October, 2016—transcribed in this Fordham Law Review issue—the 
Committee submitted a working draft of an amendment that was vetted by 
the experts at the conference and reviewed favorably by most.  This Article 
analyzes the arguments in favor of and against the reform of the residual 
exception and will set forth and explain the Advisory Committee’s approach 
to a possible amendment. 
In its current form, Rule 807 provides as follows: 
Rule 807.  Residual Exception 
(a) In General.  Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is 
not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: 
 (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness; 
 (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
 (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 
 (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice. 
(b) Notice.  The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, 
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer 
the statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s name and 
address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.1 
The residual exception contains several limitations that tend to make it 
useful only in unusual cases.  Congress made several changes to the Advisory 
Committee proposal, all with the intent to narrow the scope of the exception.2  
 
*  Reed Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Reporter to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. 
 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 2. The original Advisory Committee proposal was pretty simple.  It provided that 
statements “not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” would be admissible over a hearsay objection.  
Congress made the following changes:  (1) changing the word “comparable” to “equivalent,” 
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The legislative history indicates an intent that the residual exception be used 
“very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”3  Congress was 
concerned that an unfettered residual exception would provide courts with 
too much discretion, thereby “injecting too much uncertainty into the law of 
evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners to prepare for trial.”4  
There was also a concern that a broad residual exception would erode the 
limitations provided in the standard hearsay exceptions—allowing courts and 
litigants to evade those limitations by simply using the residual exception.5 
Congress, however, recognized two important reasons for needing a 
residual exception:  (1) there will be trustworthy statements that do not fit 
under the standard exceptions, and it would compromise the search for truth 
to exclude a reliable statement simply because it did not fall within a standard 
exception6 and (2) without a residual exception, courts might seek to 
shoehorn reliable statements into standard exceptions where they do not 
really fit—a process that would improperly change the meaning and breadth 
of those exceptions.7 
The question of “rules v. discretion” received an airing at the Advisory 
Committee’s “Symposium on Hearsay Reform” in the fall of 2015.8  In 
discussion after the symposium, the Committee expressed some interest in 
considering a compromise approach that would add a little bit more 
flexibility to the categorical hearsay exceptions, without going to a 
completely discretionary system that would allow the judge to determine 
whether hearsay is sufficiently reliable to be admissible in every case.  One 
 
(2) adding the requirement that the hearsay be more probative than any other evidence 
reasonably available, (3) adding the requirement that the statement be proof of a material fact, 
(4) adding the requirement that admitting the statement will serve the purposes of the rules 
and the interests of justice, and (5) adding the pretrial notice requirement. See H.R. REP. NO. 
93-1597, at 11 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7105. 
  Originally there were two identically worded residual exceptions:  Rule 803(24), 
which covered situations in which the declarant was available, and Rule 804(b)(5), which 
covered situations in which the declarant was unavailable.  In 1997, the two exceptions were 
combined into a single exception, codified in Rule 807.  No change in meaning was intended. 
See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment.  In fact, however, a 
substantive change was made because the necessary “equivalence” comparison was extended 
to both Rule 803 and 804 exceptions for every statement offered as residual hearsay. See infra 
text accompanying notes 16–28. 
 3. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 18 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065. 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 5 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7079. 
 5. See generally David A. Sonenshein & Ben Fabens-Lassen, Has the Residual 
Exception Swallowed the Hearsay Rule?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2016) (discussing the 
concern in Congress and elsewhere that the residual exception will be used as a way to evade 
limitations set forth in the standard exceptions). 
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee’s note (“It would, however, be 
presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been 
catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system.”). 
 7. See United States v. Popenas, 780 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing how 
Congress ultimately included the residual exceptions, “fearing that without these provisions 
the more established exceptions would be unduly expanded in order to allow otherwise reliable 
evidence to be introduced”). 
 8. See generally Symposium on Hearsay Reform, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
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of the possibilities focused on expanding Rule 807, as described by the 
minutes of the meeting: 
Committee members agreed that it would be worthwhile to explore possible 
compromise alternatives for hearsay reform—i.e., something not as radical 
as removing all the exceptions in favor of [discretionary] balancing, and 
yet something more than retaining the current system of categorical rules.  
One possibility is to expand the applicability of Rule 807, the residual 
exception.  This might be accomplished by removing the “more probative” 
requirement of that rule, so that it could be invoked without the showing of 
necessity that is currently required.  The trustworthiness requirement might 
also be changed from one requiring “equivalence” with the other 
exceptions to something more freestanding and discretionary.9 
This Article considers various possibilities for fixing or expanding the 
applicability of the residual exception, including the two described above.  
Before discussing how Rule 807 could be improved and expanded (or simply 
improved), the following points should be emphasized:  First, the discussion 
is focused on a possible freestanding expansion of Rule 807; but it is apparent 
that an expansion of the residual exception (if deemed a good idea) could also 
be part of broader revisions of the hearsay system.  For example, an 
expansion of the residual exception might make limitations on or 
eliminations of other hearsay exceptions more viable.  Thus, the Advisory 
Committee’s proposed elimination of the ancient documents hearsay 
exception—Rule 803(16)—was premised on the argument that ancient 
documents should be admissible only if reliable and that reliability could be 
established for qualified ancient documents under the residual exception.10  
But the substantial pushback in the public comment was in part based on the 
perceived difficulty of trying to fit ancient documents into the existing, 
limited residual exception.11 
 
 9. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 9, 2015, 
at 4, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutes_fall_2015_meeting_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W9Q2-JVHJ]. 
 10. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 17, 2015, 
at 3–5, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-04-evidence-minutes_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Q3WJ-2YB2]. 
 11. For public comments to the Proposed Abrogation of Rule 803(16), see Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, REGULATIONS.GOV, https:// 
www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=ASC&sb=docId&po=0&dct=PS&D=US
C-RULES-EV-2015-0003 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/J9FH-JKFS].  
Comments highlighting the narrow coverage of the residual exception include comments 
0049, 0164, and 0174.  Comment 0143 provides a different critique:  that substituting the 
residual exception for the ancient documents exception will lead to inconsistent determinations 
and too much discretion for district judges. See Roger Park, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=USC-RULES-EV-2015-0003-0143 [https://perma.cc/EQW5-NHFF]. 
  As to the ancient documents exception, the Advisory Committee, in response to public 
comment, proposed an amendment that would narrow, rather than eliminate, Rule 803(16).  
The current proposal is to limit the ancient documents exception to documents prepared before 
1998.  That proposal was approved by the Judicial Conference and is being considered by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. See Pending Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. CTS., http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-and-forms-amendments (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/9KSD-D92W]. 
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Second, Judge Richard Posner’s proposal to eliminate the exceptions for 
excited utterances, present sense impressions, and dying declarations—on 
the ground that these exceptions allow admission of unreliable hearsay—is 
dependent on an expanded residual exception to take up the slack for reliable 
statements currently covered by those exceptions.12  Also, an expanded 
residual exception would have an important role to play if the hearsay system 
were changed from categorical rules to guidelines—the residual exception 
could be the vehicle by which a court would “depart” when the guidelines do 
not cover the proffered hearsay. 
The goal of this Article is not the broader one of thinking of multiple 
amendments as an integrated whole—that is, to say the least, a long-term 
project for the Advisory Committee.  Rather, the primary goal is to explore 
ways in which the text of the residual exception might be changed so that it 
will cover more statements and provide more flexibility.  The secondary goal 
is to determine whether certain amendments to the residual exception would 
improve the Rule, even if its coverage were not to be expanded. 
Additionally, this Article takes the position that broadening the residual 
exception—and thereby allowing for more judicial discretion—is a good 
thing.  The benefits of expanding the residual exception include (1) allowing 
more flexibility from the categorical constraints of the current system, 
thereby reducing arguments about whether a statement fits within those 
constraints; (2) alleviating the pressure on a court to distort the contours of a 
standard exception by admitting ill-fitting but reliable hearsay that should 
instead be admissible under a flexible residual exception; (3) alleviating 
pressure on the existing exceptions to the extent they can be critiqued (as 
Judge Posner has done); and (4) admitting more hearsay statements that are 
in fact reliable, which will serve as at least some response to the arguments 
that the hearsay rule keeps too much evidence away from the jury, even 
though the jury is able to discount hearsay. 
The cost of expanding the residual exception, however, is often noted.  
Any move from a rules-based to a discretion-based system may lead to 
unpredictability that will cloud the prospects of settlement, prevent summary 
judgment, increase the costs of litigation, and create the need for more pretrial 
in limine rulings.  Many lawyers believe that any increase in reliable hearsay 
that might be admitted by an expansion of the residual exception is far 
outweighed by the costs that would be raised by injecting more judicial 
discretion into the hearsay system. 
This Article contends that the residual exception should be mildly 
expanded to provide more flexibility in the system and avoid the exclusion 
of reliable hearsay that currently occurs because the residual exception is said 
to be limited to “rare and exceptional”13 circumstances—whatever that 
 
 12. See Richard A. Posner, On Hearsay, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1465, 1467 (2016). 
 13. See Memorandum Regarding Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
from William K. Sessions, III, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 16 (May 7, 2016) [hereinafter May 
7, 2016, Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-05-07-evidence_ 
rules_report_to_the_standing_committee_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD8U-Z4QX]. 
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means.  Today the residual exception is too limited to cover reliable 
statements that do not fit under the categorical exceptions.  That conclusion 
is supported by an analysis of the extensive case law over the past ten years 
of its application, as discussed later in this Article.  But even if the residual 
exception is set just about right in its breadth, a number of amendments can 
be justified simply as good rulemaking. 
Part I makes the case for amending the “trustworthiness clause” (Rule 
807(a)(1)) in various respects.  Part II makes the case for amending or 
eliminating the “more probative” clause (Rule 807(a)(3)).  Next, Part III 
argues for deleting the superfluous standards of “materiality” and “interests 
of justice” (Rule 802(a)(2) and (4)).  Part IV discusses the changes that are 
necessary to the notice provision (Rule 807(b)).  Then, Part V discusses why 
the current rule needs to be amended to expand the coverage of the residual 
exception.  Part VI sets forth the Advisory Committee’s working draft of an 
amendment to Rule 807.  Finally, Part VII discusses how that proposal can 
in large part be justified as good rulemaking independent of any need to 
expand the residual exception. 
I.  THE TRUSTWORTHINESS CLAUSE 
Rule 807(a)(1) requires the trial court to find that the proffered statement 
“has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”14—equivalent 
to those guarantees found in Rule 803 and 804.  This standard is problematic 
not only in imposing a requirement of “equivalence” that cannot reliably be 
implemented but also in ignoring other factors that should be relevant to any 
trustworthiness inquiry.  Thus, it is defective in what it includes and what it 
does not include.  These points—bad language included and pertinent factors 
not included—will be discussed in turn. 
A.  Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness 
As stated above, the current exception requires the court to find that the 
proffered hearsay has “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”15  “Equivalent” is intended to require the court, in 
evaluating the hearsay, to find that it has reliability guarantees that are at an 
equal level to those found in the categorical exceptions.16  But the term 
“equivalent” is nonsensical because the trustworthiness guarantees of the 
categorical exceptions vary widely.  For example, the reason we admit 
business records (regularity) is completely different from the reason we admit 
excited utterances (because startlement stills the reflective capacity).17  
Moreover, it is common ground that the reliability guarantees of Rule 804’s 
 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Conoco, Inc., v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 392–93 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the district court erred in admitting summaries under Rule 807, in part because 
they did not possess guarantees of trustworthiness that were “equivalent” to those of market 
reports or commercial tabulations). 
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2), (6) advisory committee’s notes. 
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exceptions are weaker than those for Rule 803’s exceptions18—yet the 
equivalence language requires the court to compare the proffered hearsay to 
both the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.  “Equivalence” in this regard might 
have had more meaning when the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Evidence 
Rules” or “the Rules”) were enacted because at that time there were two 
residual exceptions, one for Rule 803 and one for Rule 804.  By combining 
the two into one exception in 1996, the Advisory Committee made the 
“equivalence” standard more opaque and difficult to apply because it 
expanded the range of exceptions for comparison.  Moreover, the 1996 
addition of Rule 804(b)(6) further muddies the waters because that 
exception—for forfeiture—is not based on any circumstantial guarantees of 
reliability at all.19  Yet Rule 807 still, at least on its face, requires the court to 
compare the proffered hearsay with the reliability requirements in all of the 
Rule 804 exceptions. 
Case law indicates that the equivalence standard can cause inconsistency 
in the application of Rule 807.  The major problem is that, given the wide 
range of options for comparison, a court can use “equivalence” as a result-
oriented device.  So if the court wants to admit the hearsay, it can rely on 
comparison with exceptions that are at the bottom of the reliability barrel.  
For example, in Virola v. XO Communications, Inc.,20 an employment action, 
the plaintiffs sought to testify to offers of employment and salary quotes they 
obtained from other employers.  The court held that the offers and quotes 
were admissible as residual hearsay to prove what the plaintiffs could really 
make in other positions.21  As to trustworthiness, the court reasoned the 
trustworthiness of an offer of employment was supported by “market 
pressures” that are “equivalent to the assurances of reliability afforded by” 
Rule 803(16), the hearsay exception for ancient documents.22  But the 
hearsay exception for ancient documents simply equates age with reliability; 
it is not supported by any circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and 
has operated as an open door for unreliable hearsay.23  Perhaps the offers 
 
 18. See id. 804(b) advisory committee’s note (noting that while the Rule 803 exceptions 
cover hearsay that is admissible even if the declarant is unavailable, the Rule 804 exceptions 
cover hearsay “which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the 
stand”). 
 19. See id. 804(b)(6) (providing for forfeiture of a hearsay objection—regardless of the 
reliability of the hearsay statement—when the opponent has wrongfully caused the 
unavailability of the declarant with the intent to prevent the declarant from testifying). 
 20. No. 05-CV-5056(JG)(RER), 2008 WL 1766601 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008). 
 21. See id. at *15–16. 
 22. Id. at *16. 
 23. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3d Cir. 
1991) (reversing the trial court’s ruling excluding an ancient document upon a finding that it 
was untrustworthy:  “Once a document qualifies as an ancient document, it is automatically 
excepted from the hearsay rule under [Rule] 803(16)”).  For a further critique of the ancient 
documents hearsay exception, see Daniel J. Capra, Electronically Stored Information and the 
Ancient Documents Exception to the Hearsay Rule:  Fix It Before People Find Out About It, 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2015). 
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were trustworthy,24 but if not, they could easily be admitted under the low 
bar of equivalence that the court chose. 
By contrast, if a court is inclined to exclude the hearsay, it can rely on some 
of the more reliable hearsay exceptions for the equivalence test.  This can 
include a finding that the hearsay statement is unlike any of the statements 
admissible under these exceptions—which should hardly be surprising 
because if it were like those statements, it would be admissible under a 
categorical hearsay exception.  An example of this misdirection occurred in 
FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc.,25 in which the court held that consumer 
complaints were insufficiently trustworthy to be admissible as residual 
hearsay to prove the fact complained about.  The court argued that “other 
exceptions have greater guarantees of trustworthiness than the consumer 
complaints”—specifically Rule 803(4), which, the court explained, “allows 
for a statement made for medical diagnosis, because it is unlikely a declarant 
would lie about her health in order to gain an advantage in litigation.”26  A 
couple of things can be said about this analysis.  First, the court chose an 
exception for comparison that was nothing like the statement being evaluated 
and that is generally thought to be among the more reliable of the hearsay 
exceptions.  Second, the court actually misstated the contours of Rule 803(4), 
as that exception actually does allow statements made by a patient in 
anticipation of litigation to be admitted—so long as the statement is pertinent 
to treatment or diagnosis.27  So the risk of the equivalence standard is not 
only cherry-picking but also misconstruing the exception that is picked as a 
comparable.28 
In sum, the “equivalence” standard provides no meaningful control on 
judicial discretion, invites judicial error, and can end up with a comparison 
of apples and oranges.  It should be replaced with a standard that focuses 
directly on whether the proffered statement is trustworthy.  For all these 
 
 24. Though maybe not, because offers are not always honored—as some law students who 
received offers of law employment around 2009 can attest. 
 25. No. 1:12-CV-2394, 2013 WL 4545143 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2013). 
 26. Id. at *2. 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
statements were admissible even where a doctor was consulted only for the purpose of 
providing expert testimony); see also 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & 
DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 803.02 (11th ed. 2015) (“A doctor 
consulted for litigation purposes is retained for ‘diagnosis,’ and the rule abolishes all 
distinctions between doctors consulted for treatment and those consulted for diagnosis.”). 
 28. Another possibility for error under the “equivalence” standard is that a court might 
use a comparable that is not even permitted by the Rule.  For example, in Auto-Owners 
Insurance v. Newsome, No. 4:12-cv-00447-RBH, 2013 WL 3148334 (D.S.C. June 19, 2013), 
the court found that a statement to police officers by one of the parties to an accident was 
trustworthy.  In assessing equivalence, the court concluded that the statement “at least has as 
much trustworthiness as a statement of a party opponent.” Id. at *6.  But that exception is 
found in Rule 801(d)(2).  Rule 807 provides only the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions as 
comparables.  Moreover, that exception is not even based on reliability—it is based on the 
theory that if the party makes a statement, they have to live with it.  As the Advisory 
Committee put it, admissibility of party-opponent statements “is the result of the adversary 
system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) 
advisory committee’s note. 
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reasons, the Advisory Committee’s working draft of an amendment to Rule 
807 deletes the equivalence requirement.  Discussion at the symposium on 
this change was largely favorable. 
B.  The Role of Corroborating Evidence 
The trustworthiness clause of Rule 807 does not include any reference to 
the existence or lack of corroborating evidence that would support the truth 
of the declarant’s account.  This absence has led to disputes about whether a 
court, in evaluating the trustworthiness of residual hearsay, can consider the 
presence or absence of corroborating evidence.29  Any amendment to Rule 
807 should address the relevance of corroborating evidence in order to end 
this conflict. 
The better rule on the merits is to allow consideration of corroborating 
evidence.  The ultimate inquiry is whether the declarant is telling the truth, 
and reference to corroborating evidence is a typical and time-tested means of 
helping to establish that a person is telling the truth.  It is used in trials every 
day, and there is no good reason to prevent consideration of corroboration (or 
its absence) when it comes to residual hearsay. 
It has been argued that relying on corroboration to find a statement 
trustworthy is nonsensical because if the hearsay is corroborated it is unlikely 
to be more probative than any other evidence reasonably available, as is 
required by Rule 807(a)(3)—the argument is that the corroborating evidence 
would be equally probative as the hearsay.30  But surely this is too simplistic.  
It is more likely to be the case that the hearsay statement is fortified by the 
corroboration, and the corroboration becomes stronger because of the hearsay 
statement.  That is precisely what occurred in Bourjaily v. United States,31 
 
 29. Compare United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that 
trustworthiness analysis must focus on “the facts corroborating the veracity of the statement” 
as well as “the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement”), and FTC v. Ross, 
No. RDB-08-3233, 2012 WL 4018037, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2012) (holding that statements 
made in an unrelated litigation were admitted as residual hearsay, in part because 
“unchallenged evidence in this case substantially corroborates the contents of the challenged 
evidence and therefore affords the challenged evidence the ‘ring of reliability’”), with Huff v. 
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he probability that the statement 
is true, as shown by corroborative evidence, is not, we think, a consideration relevant to its 
admissibility under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.”), and United States v. Stoney 
End of Horn, 829 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2016) (“According to the theory of the hearsay 
rule . . . trustworthiness must be gleaned from circumstances that ‘surround the making of the 
statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief,’ not by ‘bootstrapping on 
the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial.’”).  It should be noted that in Stoney End of Horn, 
the court ignores the fact that some of the existing hearsay exceptions rely on corroborating 
evidence to establish admissibility. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (declarations against 
penal interest in a criminal case are admissible if the proponent shows corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement). 
 30. See Sonenshein & Fabens-Lassen, supra note 5, at 728 (“[I]f there is corroboration, 
then there is no significant need for the purported residual hearsay since there is other evidence 
available on point”).  Note that this argument becomes irrelevant if the “more probative” 
requirement is deleted and diminished if the “more probative” requirement is limited to 
comparing the hearsay with other evidence from the declarant.  The deletion or narrowing of 
the “more probative” requirement is discussed below. 
 31. 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the 
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.  In Bourjaily, the challenged 
hearsay implicating the defendant in a conspiracy statement gave color to 
corroborating evidence, and the corroborating evidence supported the 
reliability of the hearsay statement.  As the Court put it:  “The sum of an 
evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts.”32  
Moreover, it could well be that, while corroborating evidence exists, the 
hearsay is in fact more probative.  For example, assume a child reports an act 
of sexual abuse and identifies her father as the perpetrator.  This statement is 
corroborated by medical evidence indicating that the child was abused.  The 
medical evidence supports the truthfulness of the child’s statement, but the 
child’s statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered:  that 
the father sexually abused the child.  The corroboration is only partial; in that 
situation it is just silly to say that because you have corroboration, you do not 
need the residual hearsay.  And it is equally wrong to say that the 
corroboration should not be considered in the reliability inquiry—if she is 
right about one fact, it makes it more likely that she is right about other 
asserted facts. 
Finally, courts should be allowed to consider that no corroborating 
evidence has been presented.  If there is no corroborating evidence, then, just 
as in real life, a factfinder needs to be more wary about accepting the 
conclusion.  Relying on the absence of corroboration is not explicitly 
permitted by the Rule—but courts have so relied, and the Rule should be 
amended to codify that result.33 
II.  MORE PROBATIVE THAN ANY OTHER EVIDENCE 
REASONABLY AVAILABLE 
Rule 807 requires not only that the proffered hearsay be trustworthy but 
also that it must be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable 
efforts.”34  This provision, added by Congress, is intended to add a 
“necessity” provision to the Rule, thus limiting the instances in which the 
Rule can be invoked—Congress made the residual exception one of “last 
resort.” 
What is being compared in the “more probative” analysis?  The proffered 
statement is compared to other evidence that could be used to prove the point 
for which the hearsay is offered.  The other evidence might be other witness 
testimony35 or some kind of document.  Often it is the possibility of in-court 
 
 32. Id. at 181. 
 33. See, e.g., Batoh v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01462 (MPS), 2016 WL 922779 
(D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2016) (finding a statement inadmissible under Rule 807 in part because it 
was uncorroborated). 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(3). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that a 
hearsay statement was not more probative than the in-court testimony of another eyewitness, 
and so it was not admissible under the residual exception—even though the hearsay declarant 
was a trustworthy person and the in-court witness’s credibility was subject to attack). 
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testimony by the declarant of the hearsay being offered.  Thus, in Larez v. 
City of Los Angeles,36 the plaintiff offered newspaper accounts of a city 
official’s statements.  The court found that the newspaper accounts were 
sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted as residual hearsay (to prove the 
statements were made) largely because the newspaper accounts cross-
corroborated each other.37  But the newspaper accounts were found 
erroneously admitted as residual hearsay because the reporters were available 
to testify.38 
The “more probative” requirement is, essentially, a best evidence 
requirement.  As the court in Larez stated, the newspaper quotations were not 
“the best available evidence.”39  That best evidence requirement imposes a 
substantial limitation on the use of the residual exception.  The rationale 
supporting this best evidence requirement was taken to task by the Montana 
Rules Commission, which recommended that Montana adopt (as it did) the 
simple version of the residual exception proposed by the Federal Advisory 
Committee.40  The Montana Rules Commission argued that the “more 
probative” requirement added by Congress was misguided because the 
restriction “would have the effect of severely limiting the instances in which 
the exception would be used and would be impractical in the sense that a 
party would generally offer the strongest evidence available regardless of the 
existence of the requirement.”41  There is much to be said for that comment.  
It is odd to allow a court under an evidence rule to tell the litigant, “there is 
other evidence that is as strong or stronger than what you have presented to 
me, so go and get that.”42  Shouldn’t the litigant have the autonomy to figure 
out what evidence it wants to put in, so long as it is probative and reliable? 
The “more probative” standard, as explained below, has led to all sorts of 
weird outcomes, allowing some courts to exclude the hearsay if there is any 
evidence from any reasonably available source that might prove the point, 
even if the evidence is different in character and even if it has not yet been 
obtained and so cannot really be assessed for trustworthiness or 
“probativeness.”43  The “more probative” language allows the court to wrest 
 
 36. 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 37. See id. at 642–44. 
 38. See id. at 641–42. 
 39. Id. at 644. 
 40. See MONT. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (providing hearsay exceptions for “[a] 
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”). 
 41. Id. 803(24) Montana rules commission comment. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Madison Inv. Tr. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., No. 08-CV-02204-MJW-
KAM, 2010 WL 1529436 (D. Colo. Apr. 2, 2010).  Here, a hearsay statement made by a 
witness in a foreign country was found inadmissible under Rule 807 because the proponent 
made no attempt to obtain testimony from the witness pursuant to letters rogatory. See id. at 
*1.  In coming to this conclusion, the court implicitly made the findings that (1) use of a letters 
rogatory procedure is within the scope of “reasonable efforts” that a proponent must try under 
Rule 807 and (2) the testimony obtained by letters rogatory from the witness would be at least 
as probative as the witness’s hearsay statement. See id.  Neither of those findings is sound.  
The letters rogatory procedure is cumbersome and lengthy.  More importantly, this procedure 
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control from the party, who should have the autonomy to decide which of 
two pieces of reliable evidence it should present—or whether to present 
both.44  Besides this transfer of power to pick among sources of valid 
evidence, the more probative language allows the court to tell the party when 
she has enough other evidence to prove a point—and that point is not when 
the other evidence becomes cumulative but rather when one piece of 
evidence is as probative as the other.45  The more probative requirement 
cannot be justified as grounded in necessity, because counsel will often need 
the so-called less probative hearsay to submit it together with the more 
probative evidence to make an evidentiary whole that is greater than the sum 
of its parts.  The presumptuousness of the more probative analysis is 
remarkable in some of the cases.46 
 
calls for answers to interrogatories—why would that be better evidence that an informal 
statement made closer in time to the event? 
 44. See, e.g., Flournoy v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 2016).  Here, the 
plaintiff alleged that officers used excessive force in executing a search warrant. See id. at 872.  
Among other things, he contended that two flashbang devices were deployed. See id. at 876.  
As proof on this point, the plaintiffs offered a handwritten notation found on one of the copies 
of an officer’s typed report:  the notation was that two flashbangs deployed. See id.  The court 
found that this notation was properly found not admissible under the residual exception. See 
id. at 876–77.  The court stated that the notation was not more probative than other evidence 
reasonably available, because “Flournoy’s two sons and the remaining occupant of the 
apartment all testified that they heard multiple explosions during the search.” Id. at 876.  The 
court’s analysis shows the fallacy of the “more probative” requirement.  The notation would 
have been quite useful to the plaintiff because it corroborated the testimony of witnesses who 
the jury may have found biased.  Even if the witness statements were equally probative (which 
is arguable) the point is that the notation added to the probative value of those statements.  The 
plaintiff should not have to choose among sources of evidence when the whole of the 
evidentiary presentation is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 45. See, e.g., Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. v. Meller Poultry Equip., Inc., No. 12-C-1227, 
2016 WL 2593935 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2016).  Here, an employee fell from a catwalk. See id. 
at *1.  Two employees made hearsay statements that the employer, Meller, had weakened the 
steel on the catwalk. See id. at *9.  One of the employees, Kreyer, made his statement while 
still employed so it was admissible against Meller under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). See id.  The other 
was made by a former employee, Schmidt—so not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)—and 
the plaintiff offered it under Rule 807. See id.  But the court excluded the statement, reasoning 
that “Schmidt’s statements about steel quality are not more probative than Kreyer’s statements 
about the same subject.  Therefore, Schmidt’s hearsay statements are not admissible under 
Rule 807.” Id. at *10.  This is an unfortunate result of the more probative test.  The hearsay 
statement from one declarant is inadmissible simply because the hearsay statement of another 
is found admissible.  Surely it is appropriate to try to admit statements from multiple 
declarants, in the same way as it is appropriate to call more than one eyewitness to an event.  
The limits on cumulative testimony imposed by Rule 403 are sufficient to protect against 
overkill.  The more probative requirement is more rigid.  It says “you do not need the hearsay 
statement if you have another statement from anyone else.”  But that seems cold comfort to 
anyone trying a case. 
 46. See, e.g., Haynes v. White County, No. 4:10CV00529 JLH, 2012 WL 460263 (E.D. 
Ark. Feb. 13, 2012).  Here, the plaintiff claimed that a prison was deliberately indifferent to 
her husband’s medical needs and that he died as a result. See id. at *1.  To prove that he had 
not been treated, the plaintiff offered the grievances that the decedent filed with the prison, 
which indicated that he had not been seen by a doctor. See id. at *4.  The court held that these 
filed grievances were not admissible under Rule 807, in part because “the plaintiff could 
through reasonable efforts obtain testimony on the issue of whether Dr. Killough came to the 
jail from other inmates or from Dr. Killough himself.” Id. at *5.  It goes without saying that 
the decedent’s statements should not be excluded whenever he could get a statement from a 
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Many problematic cases can be found excluding hearsay for failure to meet 
the more probative requirement.  For example, in Draper v. Rosario,47 a 
prisoner alleged that he had been beaten up by a prison guard.  A witness to 
the event refused to testify because he feared reprisal.48  Counsel moved for 
the witness’s prior sworn statement to be admitted under the residual 
exception.  The Ninth Circuit found no error in its exclusion.49  It concluded 
that the district court properly found that the witness’s statement was not 
more probative than the testimony that would be provided by two other 
prisoners.50  The defendant argued that the residual hearsay was more 
probative because the prisoner who made the hearsay statement had a better 
vantage point than the other two prisoners.51  The court explained and 
responded as follows: 
Draper’s counsel argued that Doe’s testimony was unique because he “saw 
Mr. Draper put his foot against the bars to try to prevent his head and body 
from hitting the bars, [and] the witness was distinct that the foot move was 
defensive.”  While the other prisoner witnesses (Shepard and Thompson) 
did not provide this exact account, they both testified that Draper was at no 
time resisting Rosario and that Rosario was the aggressor.  On this record, 
the district court reasonably concluded that Doe’s statement about Draper’s 
defensive foot move was not significantly more probative than the 
testimony already presented.52 
 Let us pass by the court’s holding that the residual hearsay was not 
significantly more probative than the statements from the other prisoners—
the word “significantly” is not in the Rule, and the more probative 
requirement is hard enough to satisfy as written.  The fundamental flaw is 
that the court is holding that the residual hearsay is not more probative even 
though the statement is more detailed and the declarant had a better vantage 
point.  Assuming the hearsay is reliable, the more probative requirement is 
being used to deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity of proving the point with 
what appears to be better evidence.  But more importantly, he is deprived of 
the opportunity to make a full and effective submission by offering the 
hearsay together with the statements of the available eyewitnesses.53 
 
hostile witness (in this case the doctor).  Moreover it is presumptuous to conclude that other 
prisoners would know whether the doctor came to the jail.  Who are these other witnesses, 
anyway? 
 47. 836 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 48. See id. at 1080. 
 49. See id. at 1082. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 1080. 
 53. See Rosenbaum v. Freight, Lime & Sand Hauling, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-287, 2013 WL 
785481 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 1, 2013).  Here, a witness named Grecco was stopped at a light when 
he was rear ended by a truck. See id. at *1.  The dispute was over whether a truck behind that 
truck was responsible for the accident. See id.  Grecco made a taped statement to a 
representative of the defendant, and the defendant sought to admit it as residual hearsay. See 
id.  The court found that the statement was trustworthy because Grecco was an innocent party 
with no motive to falsify; also, he stated that he knew he was being recorded and that his 
statement could be used at trial. See id. at *2.  But the court found that Grecco’s statement was 
inadmissible under Rule 807 because it was not more probative than other evidence available. 
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The more probative requirement has even led courts to send the proponent 
on a quest for evidence that has not yet been obtained or validated.  That 
problem was shown in Nance v. Ingram,54 a case in which the plaintiff 
alleged that a sheriff interfered with the plaintiffs’ business after the plaintiffs 
contributed to the sheriff’s opponent in a campaign.  The plaintiffs offered a 
hearsay statement from an official (now deceased) who attended a 
department meeting and told one of the plaintiffs about a directive issued by 
the sheriff that would harm their business.55  The court held that the hearsay 
statement was not admissible under Rule 807, because 
there are a number of other witnesses from whom plaintiffs could obtain 
similar evidence with reasonable efforts.  For example, plaintiffs could 
have deposed or sought affidavits from other attendees of the BCSO 
department meeting or from any one of the former patients who allegedly 
left plaintiffs’ healthcare practice due to defendant Ingram’s directive.56 
The problem with the more probative requirement in Nance is that the 
court is allowed to hypothesize other sources of evidence that can be used to 
prove the point.  Who is to say that these witnesses, if they even exist, would 
have the same account of that directive when interviewed years later?  Who 
is to say that the people affected by the directive—who did not even hear the 
statement—would provide useful information in proving the sheriff’s 
culpability?  It is as if the more probative requirement allows the court to tell 
the lawyer how to try her case. 
All this is not to challenge the point that the residual exception should 
contain a necessity requirement.  But the question is, to what should the 
residual hearsay be compared in order to assess necessity?  Surely the most 
straightforward test is the one used in the necessity-based hearsay exceptions 
found in Rule 804:  Is the declarant available to give testimony that is better 
evidence than his or her hearsay statement?  It gets complicated, intrusive, 
and harsh when the inquiry is taken further—as it is in Rule 807—and 
necessity is based not only on declarant availability but also on availability 
of any other evidence from any source, even a hypothetical one. 
The hearsay rule is concerned about live testimony from the declarant, not 
testimony from alternative sources on the same subject matter.57  Thus, if the 
available alternative evidence comes from other witnesses or documents, 
there is much to be said for a rule allowing the proponent to elect whether to 
offer reliable hearsay in lieu of (or together with) that other evidence.  
Forcing the proponent to seek out that other evidence, or to establish that it 
 
See id. at *4.  That was because the drivers of the two trucks could testify to what happened. 
See id.  That conclusion shows the basic problem with the more probative requirement.  
Grecco’s statement would be quite useful because the two drivers involved in the accident 
would likely have conflicting accounts.  The more probative requirement could be more 
usefully and predictably applied if the hearsay were compared only to other evidence available 
from the declarant—as opposed to a comparison with all other evidence in the case. 
 54. No. 7:14-CV-9-FL, 2015 WL 5719590 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 55. See id. at *6–7. 
 56. Id. at *7. 
 57. For example, an excited utterance is not excluded whenever there is other evidence 
that can be presented to prove the point. 
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is not as probative as the residual hearsay, is outside the concerns of the 
hearsay rule and runs contrary to the basic principle that the parties get to 
choose which admissible evidence to present. 
Consequently, the more probative requirement of Rule 807 should either 
be deleted (following the lead of Montana) or modified.  The rational 
modification would be to focus on whether there is any other evidence that 
can be obtained from the declarant.  That would mean that Rule 807 could 
be used if the declarant were unavailable, even though there are other 
alternatives to proving the point for which the hearsay is offered.  It would 
also mean that the hearsay could be introduced even if the declarant were 
available but, for some reason, the residual hearsay would be better evidence 
than the declarant’s in-court testimony.  A possible example would be a 
residual hearsay statement from a child; the child’s trustworthy out-of-court 
statement concerning sexual abuse, for example, is often considered to be 
more probative under current law because the child may not be able to 
communicate as well on the stand as he or she did out of court.58 
An amendment that would focus on the declarant, rather than all other 
available evidence, might look like this: 
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence testimony from the declarant that the proponent can obtain 
through reasonable efforts. 
But the Advisory Committee has decided to retain the existing more 
probative requirement out of a concern that without it, the residual exception 
would be subject to widespread use.59  The Committee determined that the 
more probative requirement will preserve the congressional determinations 
that proponents should not be able to use the residual exception unless they 
really need it.60  The Committee also determined that retaining the more 
probative requirement will send a signal that any changes that are proposed 
are intended to be modest—there would be no attempt to allow the residual 
exception to swallow the categorical exceptions or even to permit the use of 
the residual exception if the categorical exceptions are available.61  
Consequently, the above change to the more probative requirement is not 
included in the Advisory Committee’s working draft.62 
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that 
where a child-witness was hampered by developmental problems and his verbal abilities were 
overcome by the courtroom setting and the delicate nature of the material to which he was 
attesting, “[u]nder these circumstances, we are unwilling to hold that a child victim’s 
testimony is always more probative than the prior hearsay statements he or she may have made 
in the more relaxed environs of a doctor’s or social worker’s office”). 
 59. May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 17. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See infra Part VI. 
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III.  DELETING THE SUPERFLUOUS REQUIREMENTS  
OF “MATERIALITY” AND “INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” 
In addition to the “more probative” requirement, Congress added two 
further admissibility requirements to the residual exception:  (1) the statement 
must be offered as evidence of a material fact and (2) admitting it will serve 
the purposes of the rules and the interests of justice.63 
Neither of these admissibility requirements have much content.  
Apparently they were intended to set the tone for the mantra that the residual 
exception was only to be used in “rare and exceptional” cases.64  The end 
result has been either (1) they are harmless checkoffs, mentioned only after 
a court has already determined that the hearsay is admissible or inadmissible 
or (2) they are used as fake excuses for a court to come to its result of 
excluding proffered hearsay. 
A.  Materiality 
It is ironic that the word “material,” which found its way into the residual 
exception, was studiously avoided in the definition of relevance set forth in 
Rule 401.  The Advisory Committee believed that the word should not be 
used, because it has many different legal meanings.65  Congress, in inserting 
the word “materiality,” appears to have intended to limit the use of the 
residual exception to important evidence—evidence highly likely to affect 
the outcome of a case.  But courts have essentially read “material” to mean 
“relevant”; thus, the addition of materiality to Rule 807 is superfluous 
because it adds nothing to that which has already been accomplished by Rule 
401 (the definition of relevance) and 402 (the Rule providing that irrelevant 
evidence is inadmissible).66 
 A good discussion of the weirdness of the materiality requirement is 
found in United States v. Gotti,67 in which the court assessed whether 
statements about threats were admissible as residual hearsay.  The court noted 
that the term “material fact” was “not defined in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.”68  If it was intended to be part of a relevance standard, then “the 
qualification adds nothing to the sentence in Rule 402 excluding irrelevant 
evidence.”69  It further noted that “Congress and not the Advisory Committee 
drafted [the residual exception] and nothing in the legislative history throws 
light on the question of whether the drafters sought to make a distinction 
 
 63. See FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2), (a)(4). 
 64. May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 16. 
 65. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment (language 
chosen to define relevance “has the advantage of avoiding the loosely used and ambiguous 
word ‘material’”). 
 66. See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 807.03 (Mark S. Brodin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2016) (observing that the material fact 
requirement of Rule 807 “would be imposed in any event, however, by Rules 401 and 402”). 
 67. 641 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 68. Id. at 287. 
 69. Id. 
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between ‘material’ and ‘relevant.’”70  Under these circumstances the court 
concluded that “[a]t least the evidence must be relevant.”71 
The most that can be said is that the term “material” is a mild guideline to 
treat the question of relevance and cumulativeness with some care.  One 
treatise tries to squeeze out some independent meaning for the materiality 
requirement with this explanation: 
Perhaps the purpose was to say the catchall should be invoked only if the 
point to be proved is important rather than minor.  Understood this way, the 
material fact requirement means that the decision whether to apply the 
catchall should take special note of the factors set out in FRE 403.  If the 
point to be proved is already strongly supported and the proffered hearsay 
would add little to what is already there, or if it would waste or consume 
time out of the proportion to its apparent value, it does not satisfy the 
material fact requirement.72 
The bottom line from all this appears to be that the material fact 
requirement of Rule 807 at best helps to set the tone that the residual 
exception is only to be used in cases of necessity.  But other than tone, it has 
little practical effect because its concept is already embraced in Rule 401.  
This means that if the residual exception is going to be expanded, eliminating 
the materiality requirement would be sensible because the whole enterprise 
would be to lighten the tone—i.e., to change the idea that the residual 
exception is to be left to very narrow circumstances and is to be rarely 
invoked.  Deleting the requirement that the residual hearsay must be material 
could be considered a useful change in tone. 
But even apart from any expansion, there is good cause for deleting the 
materiality provision, as it is imposes upon the court a useless, clerical 
obligation to check it off as a requirement even though it has no independent 
meaning.  The cases are legion in which a court engages in an evaluation of 
the statement’s trustworthiness and necessity and then, if it finds those factors 
met, feels compelled to declare that the statement is offered for a material 
fact.73 
B.  Purpose of the Rules and Interests of Justice 
Rule 807(a)(4) requires the court to find that admitting the proffered 
hearsay will best serve the purposes of the Evidence Rules and the interests 
of justice.  Like the material fact requirement, this language was added by 
Congress apparently to provide a signal that the residual exception was to be 
rarely employed; but in practical effect it adds nothing to what is already set 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & CHARLES H. ROSE III, EVIDENCE:  
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 8.81, at 1121 (4th ed. 2012). 
 73. See, e.g. United States v. Norwood, No. 12-CR-20287, 2015 WL 2250481 (E.D. Mich. 
May 13, 2015) (noting that the hearsay statement was relevant in running through the 
admissibility requirements of Rule 807); ADT Sec. Servs. v. Sec. One Int’l, Inc., No. 11-CV-
5149YGR, 2013 WL 4766401 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013) (same); Auto-Owners Ins. v. 
Newsome, No. 4:12-cv-00447-RBH, 2013 WL 3148334 (D.S.C. June 19, 2013) (same). 
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forth in Rule 102.  Rule 102 provides that all the Rules should be construed 
to comport with the end of “ascertaining the truth and securing a just 
determination.”74  As such, this requirement is usually just another 
checkoff—if the court finds the functional requirements of the Rule are met, 
it automatically finds that admission is in accord with the interests of 
justice.75  And, likewise, if the court finds that the functional requirements 
are not met, then admission is contrary to the interests of justice.76 
Like the materiality requirement, the interest of justice requirement is 
largely one of tone—it sends the message that the residual exception is to be 
rarely used.  And as with the materiality requirement, any effort to change 
that tone should include deletion of the admissibility requirement—it will not 
make much of a difference, but it will send the signal that the residual 
exception can be used more frequently than previously. 
But also like the materiality requirement, deleting the interests of justice 
requirement makes sense as good rulemaking independent of any expansion 
of the residual exception.  At best the provision presents a useless 
bureaucratic chore.  But it has also, in some cases, been used as an empty 
vessel for courts that want to avoid a serious analysis of trustworthiness.  For 
 
 74. FED. R. EVID. 102.  Commentators agree that Rule 807(a)(4) has little if any 
independent content. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 66, § 807.03 (noting that the 
provision is “largely a restatement of Rule 102.”); see also MUELLER, KIRKPATRICK & ROSE 
III, supra note 72, § 8.81, at 1121. 
 75. See, e.g., Thompson v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. of Hartford, No. CV-13-02437-PHX-JAT, 
2015 WL 9009964 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2015) (finding that the interests of justice requirement 
was met because the hearsay statement was trustworthy and more probative than any other 
evidence reasonably available); FTC v. Instant Response Sys., LLC, No. 13 Civ. 
00976(ILG)(VMS), 2015 WL 1650914 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015) (finding that the interests of 
justice requirement was met because the hearsay statements were more probative than any 
other evidence reasonably available); Sievert v. City of Sparks, No. 3:12-cv-0526-LRH-WGC, 
2014 WL 358698 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2014) (finding that the interests of justice requirement was 
met because the evidence was relevant); ADT Sec. Servs., 2013 WL 4766401, at *6 
(“Admitting the recordings furthers the federal rules’ paramount goal of making relevant 
evidence admissible.” (quoting FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 999 F.2d 595, 609 (9th Cir. 1993))); 
Auto-Owners Ins., 2013 WL 3148334, at *6 (after finding the other admissibility requirements 
of Rule 807 to be met, the court concluded that “[f]or these reasons, admitting the statement 
would also serve the purposes of the Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice”); Levinson 
v. Westport Nat’l Bank, Nos. 3:09cv269(VLB), 3:09-cv-1955(VLB), 3:10cv261(VLB), 2013 
WL 2181042 (D. Conn. May 20, 2013) (“Lastly, admission of the plea allocutions would 
facilitate the interests of justice in this case as it bears on material facts in dispute.”).  The 
analysis in Levinson is especially strange because one superfluous factor (interests of justice) 
is found satisfied by another superfluous factor (material fact). 
 76. Flournoy v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding the interests 
of justice requirement not met because hearsay was found insufficiently trustworthy); United 
States v. Cohen, No. 08-3282, 2012 WL 289769, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2012) (“The Court 
concludes that Kolzoff’s statement does not have ‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness,’ as other testimony which is admitted pursuant to hearsay exceptions.  
Accordingly, it would not serve the interests of justice to admit the testimony.”); United States 
v. Manfredi, No. 07-352, 2009 WL 3823230 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2009) (holding the interests 
of justice requirement was not met because the statement was not sufficiently trustworthy); 
United States v. Cubie, No. 05-CR-146, 2007 WL 3223299, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007) 
(“That Benion may have been shot in connection with a drug debt enhances the unreliability 
of his statements against the defendants.  As such, ‘the general purposes of the[] Rules [of 
Evidence] and the interests of justice’ are not best served by the admission of the statements.”). 
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example, in Lakah v. UBS AG,77 the court held that foreign bank records were 
not admissible under Rule 807.78  The proponents could not qualify the 
records under Rule 803(6) (the business records exception), because they 
could not obtain a foundation witness or a certificate.79  The court held that 
it would be against “the interests of justice” for the court to use the residual 
exception to “end-run” the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6).80  Here 
we see the interests of justice language being used as a means to explain an 
exclusion without the court having to resort to an actual investigation of 
whether the hearsay is trustworthy.  This led the court to a different result 
than other courts that have admitted foreign bank records under Rule 807.81  
“Interests of justice” should not be an excuse for judge-dependent 
predilections either opposed to or in favor of a residual exception. 
IV.  CHANGES TO THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
The current notice provision in Rule 807 provides as follows: 
(b) Notice.  The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, 
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer 
the statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s name and 
address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.82 
This notice provision is arguably problematic in at least four ways:  (1) it 
does not provide a good cause exception that would allow for late notice; (2) 
it does not require notice to be in writing; (3) the phrase “particulars, 
including the declarant’s name and address” is both too particular (requiring 
an address) and too general; and (4) it does not require the proponent to give 
notice of an intent to offer the statement as residual hearsay.  These problems 
will be addressed in sequence. 
The following discussion is colored by the fact that the Advisory 
Committee has tentatively approved changes to the notice provision that will 
solve some of the possible problems listed above—but no formal proposal 
has yet been made.83  The Advisory Committee’s tentative solutions will be 
addressed in the following discussion. 
A.  A Good Cause Provision 
 Rule 807 is the only Evidence Rule with an “absolute” pretrial notice 
requirement.  Other Rules with notice requirements provide more flexible 
time periods that might excuse lack of pretrial notice84 or explicitly state that 
 
 77. 996 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 78. Id. at 258. 
 79. See id. at 257. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding foreign bank records 
admissible under Rule 807); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(same). 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 807(b). 
 83. See May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 14, 17–18. 
 84. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(b)(2) (requiring notice to be provided in time for the party 
to have a fair opportunity to contest the evidence). 
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the pretrial notice requirement can be excused upon a finding of good 
cause.85  It is not difficult to think of cases in which an exception to a pretrial 
notice requirement for residual hearsay is justified and necessary.  Examples 
include (1) statements from declarants that, despite diligent efforts, are only 
discovered once trial has begun and (2) hearsay statements of people who are 
scheduled to be called as witnesses but who, without warning, become 
unavailable at the time of trial. 
Because some exceptions to pretrial notice seem justified, it is probably 
unsurprising that most courts have simply read a “good cause” exception into 
Rule 807.  As the court put it in Furtado v. Bishop86: 
Most courts have interpreted the pretrial notice requirement somewhat 
flexibly, in light of its express policy of providing a party with a fair 
opportunity to meet the proffered evidence.  Thus, the failure to give 
pretrial notice has been excused if the proffering party was not at fault 
(because he could not have anticipated the need to use the evidence) and if 
the adverse party was deemed to have had sufficient opportunity to prepare 
for and contest the use of the evidence (for example, because he was offered 
a continuance, did not request a continuance, or had the statement in 
advance).87 
Yet because the language of the notice requirement is absolute, some 
courts have understandably applied it the way it was written.  The leading 
proponent of a strict reading of the notice requirement is the Second Circuit, 
as indicated in United States v. Ruffin,88 where the court concluded that the 
residual exception is to be strictly construed and that the failure of the 
proponent of the evidence to provide pretrial notice cannot be cured by giving 
the opponent a continuance.89 
 
 85. See, e.g., id. 404(b)(2)(B) (requiring pretrial notice “before trial—or during trial if the 
court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice”). 
 86. 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 87. Id. at 92; see also United States v. Bachsian, 4 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 1993) (“This 
court has held, however, that failure to give pretrial notice will be excused if the adverse party 
had an opportunity to attack the trustworthiness of the evidence.”); United States v. Parker, 
749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984) (“This Circuit holds that a failure to comply with the notice 
requirement is not controlling if defendant is not harmed and ‘had a fair opportunity to meet 
the statements.’” (quoting United States v. Leslie 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976))); United 
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1385 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that most courts “have 
dispensed with strict compliance when the defendant could not show that he had been 
prejudiced”); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (“We believe that the 
purpose of the rules and the requirement of fairness to an adversary contained in the advance 
notice requirement . . . are satisfied when, as here, the proponent of the evidence is without 
fault in failing to notify his adversary prior to trial and the trial judge has offered sufficient 
time, by means of granting a continuance, for the party against whom the evidence is to be 
offered to prepare to meet and contest its admission.”). 
 88. 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 89. See id. at 358–59; see also United States v. LaGrua, Nos. 98-1323L, 98-1568, 1999 
WL 385776, at *3–4 (2d Cir. June 11, 1999) (relying on Ruffin to find no error in the exclusion 
of residual hearsay where the defendant failed to provide pretrial notice); United States v. 
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (“There is absolutely no doubt that Congress 
intended that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly enforced [so there must be] 
undeviating adherence to the requirement that notice be given in advance of trial.”). 
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Thus, any amendment to the notice provisions to add something in the 
nature of a good cause exception will have the added benefit of resolving a 
conflict in the courts—traditionally that is a reason that the Advisory 
Committee has found sufficient on its own to justify an amendment. 
It is notable, though, that there is case law under Rule 807 that allows 
notice to be excused but not necessarily in compliance with a good cause test.  
Good cause focuses on the proponent and whether there is a good excuse for 
noncompliance.  Some of the Rule 807 cases appear to focus only on whether 
the opponent was prejudiced by noncompliance.  Two cases present the 
contrasting approaches.  In United States v. Benavente Gomez,90 the court 
looks at culpability: 
Although this court has adopted a flexible approach to pretrial notice, we 
have expressly noted that the approach, at least in criminal cases, “is 
warranted only when pretrial notice is wholly impractical.”  Moreover, 
“[e]ven under a flexible approach, evidence should be admitted only when 
the proponent is not responsible for the delay and the adverse party has an 
adequate opportunity to examine and respond to the evidence.”91 
In contrast is United States v. Bachsian,92 where the court held that “failure 
to give pretrial notice will be excused if the adverse party had an opportunity 
to attack the trustworthiness of the evidence.”93  In Bachsian, the prosecution 
did not provide pretrial notice because it decided only after the trial began to 
try the residual exception (which does not seem at all to be a good cause 
excuse).94  But the defendant had notice of the documents two months prior 
to trial and so the court found no bar to admissibility.95 
Presumably, adding good cause language to the Rule would—and 
should—require some showing that the proponent had some good excuse for 
failing to meet the notice requirement; there should be some consequences to 
a culpable failure to notify.  The Rule 404(b) cases, for example, focus on 
whether the government had a good excuse for failing to comply.96 
In the end there may be little practical difference between a test that 
focuses on the culpability of the proponent and a test that focuses solely on 
prejudice to the opponent.  Assuming that the proponent has no good excuse 
for failing to give notice, an appellate court is likely to find failure harmless 
 
 90. 921 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 91. Id. at 384 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Doe, 860 
F.2d 488, 492 n.3 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 92. 4 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 93. Id. at 799. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id; see also United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
although the government had no excuse at all for failing to give notice, the court saw no 
problem because the defendants had ample opportunity to challenge the trustworthiness of the 
evidence). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
government did not become aware of the Rule 404(b) evidence until the trial had begun); 
United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2003) (same). 
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error if there is no prejudice;97 and at the trial level, a court may well decide 
that granting a continuance or other remedy is a preferable alternative to 
excluding evidence for failure to provide timely notice, even if there is no 
excuse for tardiness.  Nonetheless, adding good cause language does have a 
signaling effect that it is important in all cases to provide timely notice—and 
that the proponent assumes the risk if there is no excuse.  Therefore, it would 
appear that a provision requiring good cause will not only resolve a conflict 
in the courts under Rule 807, but it would also provide the proper approach 
for any excuse of pretrial notice. 
For all these reasons, the Advisory Committee has approved a proposal 
that would add a good cause exception to the Rule 807 notice requirement.98  
The proposal rightly still retains the obligation of the proponent to provide 
notice in sufficient time for the proponent to have a fair opportunity to meet 
the evidence.  Thus, good cause is added, but the Rule retains the concept 
that in any event the opponent should be given a fair opportunity to meet the 
evidence.  Taking the “fair opportunity” language out of the rule would 
provide a bad signal and would be unjustified as it is useful (1) to govern the 
manner and timing of notice provided before trial and (2) to assure that the 
trial judge will grant a continuance where necessary when notice is given at 
(or just before) trial. 
B.  Written Notice 
As stated above, Rule 807 does not currently require the notice to be in 
writing.  The obvious virtue of a requirement of written notice is that it 
resolves disputes over whether the notice was actually provided.  The 
downside of a written notice requirement is that it adds another procedural 
hurdle for a proponent to master—and where the opponent has received 
actual notice, the court is likely to find the written notice requirement to be 
simply a technicality.  So for example, the court in United States v. Komasa,99 
encountered an instance where the government provided actual notice of 
intent to offer a certificate under Rule 902(11), but that Rule requires the 
notice to be in writing.  The court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the records based on a finding that the defendants had 
actual notice and a full opportunity to challenge the authenticating 
certificates.100 
Yet even if the written notice requirement is likely to be excused when 
actual notice is provided, there is a virtue in including a written notice 
requirement in the Rule.  It establishes a practice that litigants should follow, 
a practice that will forestall arguments that notice was never received; and 
those who do not provide notice in writing assume the risk that a trial court 
 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628 (11th Cir. 1984) (pretrial notice 
requirement excused where the hearsay statement was the subject of a pretrial hearing, so the 
defendant was well aware of the evidence). 
 98. See May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13.  For the working draft, see infra Part 
VI. 
 99. 767 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 100. See id. 
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might not be merciful.101  For these reasons, the Advisory Committee’s 
working draft of the Rule 807 notice provision—set forth in Part VI—
provides that notice must be in writing.  Of course, the requirement of a 
“writing” includes electronic forms of communication—Rule 101(b)(6), a 
product of the 2011 restyling, provides that any reference in the Evidence 
Rules to a writing “includes electronically stored information.”102 
C.  Particulars and Address 
The term “particulars” is found nowhere else in any other notice 
requirement in the Evidence Rules.  It is not an especially helpful term, and 
it is certainly susceptible to argument about the level of detail that would be 
required for proper notice.  As applied to residual hearsay, the particulars 
could include the date and time of the statement, the person or persons to 
whom it was made, the surrounding circumstances, the location, et cetera.  
The Advisory Committee, after discussion, concluded that if the notice 
provision is to be amended, it would be useful to provide a more concrete 
term for the information provided in the notice—a term used in other Rules 
so that litigants could refer to those Rules for guidance.  The Advisory 
Committee elected to substitute the word “substance” for “particulars”—the 
proponent must notify the opponent of the substance of the residual 
hearsay.103  Under this term, the courts should apply the basic principle that 
the proponent must provide whatever information might be reasonably 
necessary to allow the opponent to fairly challenge the evidence.  Notably, 
the word “substance” is found in another place in the Evidence Rules, which 
can be used by courts and litigants to inform the scope of a notice 
requirement:  Rule 103(a)(2) requires a party making an offer of proof to 
inform the court of the “substance” of the evidence it seeks to admit.104  The 
case law construing the term “substance” requires counsel to state “with 
specificity what he or she anticipates will be the witness’s testimony.”105 
Another improvement would be to delete the requirement that the 
declarant’s address be provided.  In the typical case in which residual hearsay 
is offered, the declarant is unavailable.  This is because if the declarant is 
available, the hearsay is unlikely to satisfy the residual exception requirement 
that it be “more probative” than the declarant’s testimony.106  It is difficult to 
see the value of producing the address of a declarant who is unavailable—
and the requirement is just an absurdity when the declarant is dead.  
 
 101. Id. at 156 (“[P]arties fail to comply with . . . written notice requirements at their own 
risk.”). 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6). 
 103. See May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 14, 18. 
 104. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). 
 105. Porter-Cooper v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Tr., 49 F.3d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1995).  In 
Porter-Cooper, the offer of proof was found insufficient where the plaintiff stated simply that 
her expert would testify to “cause and effect.” Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that 
newspaper accounts were improperly admitted as residual hearsay where reporters who 
provided those accounts were available to testify—the newspaper accounts were not “more 
probative” than the testimony that the reporters could have provided). 
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Moreover, disclosing the address of a declarant is in tension with the e-
government rules, which require redaction of the home address of an 
individual in any court filing.107  And like other aspects of the notice 
requirement, the failure to provide an address has been found to be a needless 
technicality when the opponent either knows the address of the available 
declarant or can easily find it.108  For these reasons, the Advisory 
Committee’s working draft deletes the requirement that the address of the 
declarant must be provided in the notice. 
D.  Adding a Requirement of Intent 
to Invoke the Residual Exception 
The notice requirement of Rule 807 requires the proponent to disclose “the 
intent to offer the statement”109—but it does not specifically require the 
proponent to disclose the intent to offer the statement under the residual 
exception.  The courts are divided on whether specific disclosure of intent to 
offer the statement as residual hearsay is required.110  Assuming that the 
Advisory Committee decides to proceed with an amendment to the Rule 807 
notice provision, there is much to be said for resolving the conflict in the case 
law over whether notice must be given of the intent to invoke the residual 
exception. 
Whether notice of that intent must be given can have important 
consequences not only at trial but also on appeal.  One consequence of the 
more specific notice requirement is that an appellate court may be unable to 
admit a statement retroactively as residual hearsay if it was wrongly admitted 
under a different exception at trial.  If the trial court admits a hearsay 
statement under the wrong exception, the appellate court ordinarily can still 
affirm the judgment so long as the statement could have been admitted at trial 
under a different exception.  For example, if a hearsay statement is 
 
 107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1.  “Tension” and not “conflict” is the correct word because a 
Rule 807 notice is not necessarily going to be in a court filing. 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that 
even though the government did not provide the address of the declarant, the SanDisk 
Corporation, there was no error because the address could have easily been found by the 
defendant in a simple online search). 
 109. FED. R. EVID. 807(b). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is no 
particular form of notice required under the rule.  As long as the party against whom the 
document is offered has notice of its existence and the proponent’s intention to introduce it—
and thus has an opportunity to counter it and protect himself against surprise—the rule’s notice 
requirement is satisfied.”); Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 162 n.31 (D. Mass. 
2007) (noting that authorities are split on the issue, and concluding that “[p]arties are entitled 
only to notice that evidence will be offered; they do not need to be told all of the possible 
theories that the evidence may be admitted under”). Compare United States v. Ruffin, 575 
F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that the rule “can be utilized only if notice of an intention 
to rely upon it is given in advance of trial”), with Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 
167 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e note that the plain language of the rule requires the proponent of 
the hearsay statement to put the adverse party on notice that the proponent intends to introduce 
the statement into evidence.  We have interpreted this to mean that the proponent must give 
notice of the hearsay statement itself as well as the proponent’s intention specifically to rely 
on the rule as a grounds for admissibility of the hearsay statement.”). 
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erroneously admitted as an excited utterance, the court will affirm if the 
statement could have been admitted as a statement of a party-opponent under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(A).  The reasoning is that the nonoffering party is not 
prejudiced, because the evidence could have been admitted anyway.111  
However, that rule of retroactive application of a different theory does not 
apply where it would deprive the opponent of some argument or protection 
that could have been used if the theory had been presented below.  Such may 
be the case with the residual exception and its notice requirement.  Pretrial 
notice that would meet the Rule may not have been given if the statement 
was not offered at trial as residual hearsay.  Importantly, the chances of 
retroactive admission under the residual exception are significantly 
heightened if the court’s view of the notice requirement is simply that the 
opponent receive notice only of the evidence itself before trial.  However, if 
the Rule requires notice of specific intent to invoke the residual exception, 
then by definition, the appellate court will be unable to use the residual 
exception on appeal.112 
There are several good reasons for requiring a party to notify the opponent 
of the intent to invoke the residual exception.  First, limiting retroactive use 
of the residual exception on appeal appears to be consistent with Congress’s 
requirement of a careful approach to the residual exception; Congress did not 
appear to intend the residual exception to be a “bailout,” but rather to be an 
exception that would apply only upon careful consideration and in limited 
circumstances.113  Second, requiring a specific invocation will also limit the 
cavalier treatment that might occur when, at trial, a party invokes standard 
exceptions and, when rebuffed, simply falls back on the residual exception.  
Third, and perhaps most important, the need for the opponent to prepare for 
residual hearsay is arguably unique.  Statements potentially admissible as 
residual hearsay run the gamut, and the arguments for admitting or excluding 
a statement offered under Rule 807 will be case by case.  To make such a 
particularized argument, the opponent surely needs time to prepare.  And it 
would seem much more difficult for a proponent to prepare if it is unclear 
whether the residual exception is even in play.  While it is surely true that an 
experienced counsel will have a hunch that certain statements are possibly 
candidates for the residual exception, the problem is that counsel does not 
know whether the proponent will invoke that exception.  The result could be 
unfair surprise on the one hand and costly over preparation on the other.  
Moreover, the need for disclosure of intent to invoke becomes even greater 
 
 111. See Daniel J. Capra, Upholding Rulings on Grounds Not Used by Trial Court, 
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 1990, at 3. 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that records 
were erroneously admitted as business records at trial; because the government never gave 
notice of specific intent to invoke the residual exception at trial, Rule 807 could not be satisfied 
retroactively); see also United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding hearsay 
was incorrectly admitted under the business records exception, but there was no error because 
it could have been admitted as residual hearsay; defendant did not receive notice of the 
government’s intent to invoke the residual exception but did receive pretrial notice of the 
evidence, and that is all that is required under the First Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 807). 
 113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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if the scope of the residual exception is expanded.  Expanding the exception 
puts more statements in play.  It gives more call for arguments that must be 
prepared in advance because these will be case-dependent arguments with 
broader discretion. 
It is true that requiring a notice of intent to invoke the residual exception 
imposes an extra burden on the proponent; and it will prevent proponents 
from adjusting on the fly at trial and on appeal.  It should be remembered, 
however, that adding a good cause exception will ameliorate some of the pain 
of a more specific notice requirement and will allow some flexibility.  
Moreover, a number of circuits, as discussed above, already require the 
proponent to disclose an intent to invoke the exception; it does not appear, at 
least from the reported cases, that such a requirement has been particularly 
disruptive in those courts.  It could be said that the end result is simply that 
proponents will be better prepared by focusing in advance on the possibility 
of using the residual exception, that opponents will be better prepared to meet 
the evidence, and that better preparation on both sides is a good thing. 
Despite these arguments, the Advisory Committee has, at least at this 
point, decided not to impose the requirement that the proponent provide 
notice of intent to invoke the residual exception.114  The concern is that a 
proponent may not know at the time notice is provided that he or she will 
need to use the residual exception—the result could be that in an 
overabundance of caution, the proponent would overnotify, i.e., provide 
notice of intent for virtually all hearsay in the case.  The Committee has so 
far concluded that the value of the “intent-to-invoke” notice could end up 
being minimal despite all the trouble that an intent-to-invoke requirement 
would cause. 
V.  IS RELIABLE HEARSAY OFFERED UNDER RULE 807 
BEING EXCLUDED? 
When the Advisory Committee’s working draft of a possible expansion to 
Rule 807 was presented to the Standing Committee, a member asked, “Is this 
necessary?”  The answer is “yes” if the courts are rejecting reliable hearsay 
offered under Rule 807—either because courts are setting too high a standard 
of trustworthiness or are applying some other requirement in Rule 807 that is 
getting in the way of admitting reliable and necessary hearsay.  One way to 
try to figure out whether an expansion is needed is to review how courts in 
reported cases have treated hearsay proffered under Rule 807. 
It must be recognized, though, that a review of reported cases provides a 
skewed database for determining whether the residual exception needs to be 
expanded.  This is so for a number of reasons.  Many if not most court 
exclusions of evidence at trial go unreported.  Also, the issue might be 
decided in an unpublished order in response to a motion for summary 
judgment or a motion in limine.  Appellate court decisions are a particularly 
skewed set, because they will not show instances in which the government in 
a criminal case offers evidence under Rule 807 and is rebuffed by the trial 
 
 114. See May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 15. 
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court.  Moreover, even if the exclusion is reviewed in a reported appellate 
decision, the abuse of discretion standard skews the outcome because the 
appellate court is not holding that the evidence could not be admitted but only 
that the trial court was not egregiously wrong in excluding it. 
Finally, it is often difficult to assess, in reading a case, whether the 
proffered hearsay is actually reliable or not.  There will be easy cases showing 
unreliability, such as a diary prepared by a party once litigation has begun.  
But often the description of the hearsay in an opinion does not provide 
enough about the circumstances or the strength of the corroborating evidence 
to draw a sound conclusion on whether the hearsay was reliable enough to be 
admitted.  It is also possible that the description of the evidence is itself result 
oriented:  a court might underplay the reliability factors in its description if it 
has determined that the evidence should be excluded. 
The fact that case law provides at best a fuzzy picture of how a Rule is 
operating is one of the most difficult challenges of rulemaking.  Are there 
alternative sources of empirical data?  Here are some possibilities: 
 In some cases, it might be appropriate to resort to surveys of courts 
and litigants to determine how effective a Rule is and also to get some 
indication from survey participants how a proposed amendment might 
play out.  The Advisory Committee did have the Federal Judicial 
Center conduct a survey before it proposed an amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) (the rule on prior consistent statements).  The intent of 
the survey was in part to determine whether an amendment to the Rule 
was necessary—but the survey questions and answers were pretty 
abstract and, frankly, the results were ambiguous enough so that they 
could have been (and were) used to support or attack the proposed 
amendment.115  The Committee also heard from a number of judges 
informally, who complained about all the surveys they were asked to 
respond to.  So there is doubt on whether the benefits of a survey 
outweigh the costs. 
 Another source of empirical information comes from the public 
comment period once a Rule has been approved and submitted for that 
comment.  But of course that public comment comes after the Rule is 
proposed; it would clearly be useful to obtain some data in advance of 
release to the general public on whether the Rule is necessary.  More 
importantly, the public comment is often skewed by commenters 
whose focus is not good rulemaking but rather on how the amendment 
will affect their practice, client base, or interest group.  And the 
volume of comment can be deceptive because much of it may consist 
of identical comment from a number of different individuals but 
proceeding from a single source.116 
 
 115. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 3, 2012, at 
5, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AX39-PK29]. 
 116. For example, many of the public comments responding to the recent proposal to 
eliminate Rule 803(16), the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule, were virtually 
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 Another source is the miniconference, which operates as a kind of 
focus group of experts, whose only agenda is to develop workable and 
useful rules.  The Civil Rules Committee conducted many of these 
miniconferences as it worked to propose amendments to the discovery 
rules.  That model as developed by the Civil Rules Committee has 
now been taken up by the Evidence Rules Committee and has proved 
very useful in helping the Committee determine when Rule 
amendments are warranted and when they are not.  As seen in this 
volume, the miniconference of the Advisory Committee’s current 
agenda items resulted in helpful comments and input on the necessity 
for amendment to Rule 807 and other Rules. 
In any case, while case law is not a perfect indicator of the need for a rule 
change, the reported cases are undeniably relevant to the enterprise.  The 
Reporter therefore undertook to review and summarize all reported cases 
decided in the past ten years in which a court has reviewed, with some 
analysis, a claim that hearsay is admissible under Rule 807.  The results of 
the Reporter’s research are set forth in two lengthy case digests; one covering 
cases in which the proffered hearsay is admitted and the other covering cases 
excluding the hearsay.117 
What are the takeaways from a review of all these cases? 
(1) That is a lot of cases.  It is surprising how many times Rule 807 has 
been invoked.  There are 114 reported cases in which the court seriously 
addressed a Rule 807 question and excluded the evidence.  There are 71 cases 
in which the hearsay was found admissible under Rule 807.  The fairly high 
volume of cases in which Rule 807 has been invoked indicates that it is an 
important Rule and so raises the level of necessity for an amendment if the 
Rule is not operating properly.  It is not like a backwater rule for which error 
might be tolerated. 
(2) Courts are excluding well more than admitting.  It is not a scientific 
sample, but the case digest does go through about 200 cases over a ten-year 
period—and the difference between numbers of exclusions versus 
admissions is notable.  Obviously there are many possible causes for this 
disparity, but it provides at least relevant information that, by and large, (1) 
the residual exception is not being abused and (2) a good number of litigants 
with at least colorable claims that their hearsay is reliable are being rebuffed. 
As the Reporter’s notes to the cases indicate, there are a number of 
exclusions in which the courts impose very high standards:  clear 
trustworthiness, significantly more probative, truly exceptional, must 
 
identical. See generally Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, supra 
note 11. 
 117. These case digests are on file with the author and are also included in the Agenda 
Book for the fall 2016 meeting of the Advisory Committee. See Memorandum Regarding 
Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, 
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2016), 
in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE OCTOBER 2016 AGENDA BOOK 109 apps. 1–
2 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T9GH-DHXD]. 
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compare favorably to a standard exception, et cetera.  There are a number of 
cases where the evidence as described looks quite trustworthy, and yet the 
court, applying these strict and sometimes indefinable standards, excludes the 
evidence.  These heightened standards are not even found in the language of 
Rule 807 itself.  And there are a number of cases in which the “more 
probative” requirement is used to exclude reliable hearsay that would actually 
be helpful and even necessary to the proponent’s case.  So while more can be 
learned in public comment, it might be tentatively concluded that the residual 
exception in many courts is applied in such a way as to exclude reliable and 
necessary hearsay.  There is no evidence, however, that the residual exception 
is being used widely to undermine the standard hearsay exceptions on a 
regular basis.  Contrary to the belief of some law professors, the residual 
exception is not being applied broadly, and it is definitely not swallowing the 
hearsay rule.118 
(3) The equivalence standard is troublesome.  The cases indicate that the 
Advisory Committee was correct in tentatively agreeing to scrap the 
equivalence language in Rule 807.  As seen in the case digest, the equivalence 
standard has resulted in serious problems of application and has taken many 
courts away from the task of determining whether the proffered hearsay is 
actually reliable.  And as stated above, it is often outcome determinative.  If 
the court wants to reject a statement, it compares the hearsay to an exception 
that is based on different guarantees of trustworthiness than those provided 
in the proffered hearsay and then holds that there is no equivalence.  If the 
court wants to admit a statement, it compares the hearsay to the lamest 
exceptions and concludes that the hearsay is at the very least equivalent to 
that.  Some courts have even compared the proffered hearsay to exceptions 
that the Rule does not itself list as a comparable because they are not located 
in Rules 803 or 804, such as an agency statement.119  Thus, the equivalence 
test complicates and obfuscates the goal of the enterprise, which is to 
determine whether the proffered hearsay is actually reliable. 
(4) The more probative standard is troublesome.  As discussed above, the 
more probative standard has led to all sorts of weird outcomes, allowing some 
courts to exclude the hearsay if there is any evidence from any reasonably 
available source that might prove the point, even if the evidence is different 
in character and even if it has not yet been obtained and so cannot really be 
assessed for trustworthiness or “probativeness.”  The more probative 
language has also allowed courts to take control from the party, who should 
have the autonomy to decide which of two pieces of reliable evidence it 
should present—or whether to present both.120 
(5) The “rare and exceptional” language from the legislative history is 
troublesome.  To a number of courts, the phrase “rare and exceptional” is part 
of the text of the Rule rather than just legislative history.  The case digest 
shows a number of cases in which the court essentially ignored the language 
 
 118. See generally Sonenshein & Fabens-Lassen, supra note 5. 
 119. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. v. Newsome, No. 4:12-cv-00447-RBH, 2013 WL 
3148334 (D.S.C. June 19, 2013). 
 120. See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
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of the Rule and proceeded to the question of whether the proffered hearsay 
was “exceptional”—whatever that means.121  To say something like “a 
bystander’s statement about an event is not exceptional” totally misses the 
point—which is to determine whether the statement is trustworthy.  
“Exceptional” was never intended to be a substitute for a trustworthiness 
analysis.122 
Is there a way to prevent courts from using an exceptionalist test instead 
of reviewing for trustworthiness as the Rule requires?  It seems odd to amend 
the text of the Rule to solve this problem because the language is not even in 
the Rule.  Perhaps the deletion of the equivalence language, together with the 
deletion of the superfluous tone setters of “materiality” and “interests of 
justice,” would be a sufficient signal that a court should not be limited to rare 
and exceptional circumstances in admitting residual hearsay.  But it is 
probably useful to be more direct by adding language to the Committee Note 
that shows an intent to reject an exceptionalist review of the proffered 
hearsay.  The draft Committee Note, set forth in Part VI, makes such an 
attempt. 
(6) There is a dispute about whether the trustworthiness of the in-court 
witness should be taken into account.  Assume that a witness is going to be 
called to relate a hearsay statement that the proponent proffers as residual 
hearsay.  In the Third Circuit, the court will be required to consider whether 
the witness relating the statement is trustworthy.  So for example, if the 
witness is a party, the court would consider if the witness has a motive to 
falsify and so might relate a statement different from what the declarant 
actually said—or might even make up the fact that the statement was even 
made. 
An example of a focus on the reliability of the witness is found in United 
States v. Manfredi.123  In a tax prosecution, the defendant sought to show that 
he had a tax-free source of income—monetary gifts from his father.124  To 
prove this, he sought to introduce testimony from his aunt that she spoke to 
the father when he was hospitalized, and the father said that he had given his 
son and daughter-in-law “more money than they w[ould] ever need.”125  The 
 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 281 F. App’x 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Before the 
District Court, Wilson’s primary argument in favor of admission of the private investigator’s 
testimony was that Renee Russell had ‘no reason to lie,’ and he now argues that a person 
‘speaking to a stranger about a matter in which they have no involvement or interest, will 
generally make truthful statements.’  This is not an ‘exceptional guarantee of 
trustworthiness.’” (citations omitted)); S. Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. 
of S. Conn., No. 3:13-CV-00792(RNC), 2015 WL 4509425 (D. Conn. July 24, 2015) 
(excluding statements by hospital patients that were solicited for business even though they 
were made by declarants with no motive to lie because the circumstances were not 
“exceptional”). 
 122. Notably one state actually inserted language into its residual exception requiring the 
court to find “exceptional circumstances” before the proffered hearsay can be admitted. See 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2804.1 (West 2016).  While that provision can be criticized for 
imposing a fuzzy and distracting admissibility requirement, at least it can be said that it is 
placed in the text of the rule, rather than in some checkered legislative history. 
 123. No. 07-352, 2009 WL 3823230 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2009). 
 124. See id. at *3. 
 125. Id. at *1, *4. 
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court found that the father’s statement was not admissible as residual 
hearsay.126  In so holding, the court stated that the trustworthiness evaluation 
requires consideration of who the witness is, and here the aunt was biased in 
favor of her nephew and so may have been lying about whether the statement 
was ever made.127  The district court in Manfredi relied on United States v. 
Bailey,128 in which the court directed district courts to consider “the 
reliability of the reporting of the hearsay by the witness” in determining 
trustworthiness under Rule 807.129 
This focus on the witness is misguided when analyzing the trustworthiness 
of the hearsay statement.  The testifying witness’s credibility is a question for 
the jury, not the judge.  The hearsay question is whether the out-of-court 
statement is reliable.  The reliability of the in-court witness is not a hearsay 
problem because that witness is testifying under oath and subject to cross-
examination about what she heard.  That point has been recognized by most 
courts.130  It appears that the Third Circuit is alone in requiring an assessment 
of the reliability of the in-court witness under Rule 807. 
If Rule 807 were to be amended, it would be useful to address the conflict 
in the courts about whether the reliability of the witness should be considered 
in the trustworthiness inquiry.  It would of course be best to have a uniform 
approach—and, on the merits, the best result would be to correct the Third 
Circuit’s misconception that the trustworthiness of the witness is part of the 
hearsay analysis. 
If such a change is to be made, it should probably be in the Committee 
Note.  Adding a sentence of text (such as, “but the trustworthiness of a 
witness relating the hearsay statement is not to be considered”) might be 
problematic because the same question arises under any hearsay exception, 
and the same answer is given for every one—the trustworthiness of the 
witness is a question for the jury, and the trustworthiness of the declarant is 
the hearsay question for the court.  Addressing the reliability of the in-court 
witness in the text of one exception but not another may create confusion and 
lead to arguments that the reliability of the witness is relevant for exceptions 
as to which the text remains silent. 
The Advisory Committee has previously encountered the “reliability of the 
witness” issue.  When considering an amendment to Rule 804(b)(3) (the 
hearsay exception for declarations against interest), the Committee found that 
a few courts were evaluating the “corroborating circumstances” requirement 
under that Rule as requiring consideration of the reliability of the witness.  
The Committee concluded that this focus on the witness was misguided 
 
 126. Id. at *5. 
 127. See id. at *3. 
 128. 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 129. Id. at 349. 
 130. See, e.g., Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The 
fundamental question [for residual hearsay] is not the trustworthiness of the witness reciting 
the statements in court, but of the declarant who originally made the statements.”); Huff v. 
White Motor Co., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[The] witness can be cross-examined 
and his credibility thus tested in the same way as that of any other witness.  It is the hearsay 
declarant, not the witness who reports the hearsay, who cannot be cross-examined.”). 
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because the witness was testifying in court, and so her credibility was a 
question for the jury.  The Committee decided that the problem of assessing 
the credibility of a witness relating a hearsay statement was best addressed in 
the Committee Note—because addressing it in the text would raise a negative 
inference as to other exceptions where such language is not included.  The 
pertinent passage in the 2010 Committee Note reads as follows: 
In assessing whether corroborating circumstances exist, some courts have 
focused on the credibility of the witness who relates the hearsay statement 
in court.  But the credibility of the witness who relates the statement is not 
a proper factor for the court to consider in assessing corroborating 
circumstances.  To base admission or exclusion of a hearsay statement on 
the witness’s credibility would usurp the jury’s role of determining the 
credibility of testifying witnesses.131 
A similar provision should be included in a Committee Note to any 
amendment to the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 807.  Such a provision 
is included in the working draft set forth in Part VI. 
(7) There is a dispute about using corroboration to determine 
trustworthiness.  The case digests bear out what was discussed in Part II:  the 
courts dispute whether to consider corroborating evidence in the 
trustworthiness inquiry.132  The cases show that most courts do rely on 
corroboration; and they also show that no courts hold that a hearsay statement 
is trustworthy solely because it is corroborated.  This view, that corroboration 
is a factor but not the sole factor, is surely the correct result—we rely on 
corroboration to determine trustworthiness virtually every day, and there is 
no reason to disregard corroboration when it comes to residual hearsay.  The 
Advisory Committee’s working draft accordingly directs courts to consider 
the existence or absence of corroboration in assessing trustworthiness. 
(8) The materiality requirement is useless.  The case review validates the 
Committee’s tentative decision to delete the materiality requirement of Rule 
807.  Out of the almost 200 cases reviewed, there was not a single one in 
which the materiality requirement made a difference.  Rather, it is a 
bureaucratic checkoff and tracks the relevance requirement exactly.  There is 
no reason at all why a court must write an opinion in which it analyzes two 
admissibility requirements in exactly the same way. 
(9) The interests of justice requirement is either useless or pernicious.  The 
case digests indicate that for the most part, the interest of justice requirement 
is superfluous because it is found to be met when another requirement in the 
Rule is met:  for instance, admission is found to be within the interests of 
justice because the hearsay is trustworthy or is more probative than any other 
evidence.133  Or, admission is contrary to the interests of justice because the 
hearsay is unreliable and the opponent never got a chance to cross-examine. 
 
 131. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
 132. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 133. See, e.g., Royal & Sun All. Ins. PLC v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., No. 09 C 5935, 2011 
WL 3874878, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) (noting that “[t]he inclusion of the statement 
best serves the interest of justice, as the unfortunate fact that Crews succumbed to his injuries 
should not preclude IMSCO from introducing statements from the only available 
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If the interests of justice factor is simply superfluous, then it should be 
deleted for the same reason as the materiality requirement.  But as discussed 
in Part III, it turns out that in some cases, courts have invoked the interests of 
justice language to exclude residual hearsay that might be trustworthy.134  
The interests of justice language might be used as a way for judges to apply 
their discretion independent of the reliability and necessity of the hearsay 
statement.  All the more reason why the Advisory Committee’s decision to 
delete the interests of justice requirement in its working draft appears to be 
justified. 
VI.  THE WORKING DRAFT 
The working draft of an amendment to Rule 807, together with a draft 
Committee Note, is produced below.  The draft has been modified in light of 
comments received at the miniconference reproduced in this issue.  Most 
importantly, a comment that it would be helpful to include a reference in the 
trustworthiness clause to “the totality of circumstances” has been 
implemented.  “Totality of circumstances” is a well-known standard and 
emphasizes that the trial court’s review of trustworthiness should not be 
artificially limited.135 
It must be emphasized, however, that the Advisory Committee has not 
made a final decision to propose an amendment to Rule 807, other than the 
amendments to the notice provisions.  Regarding the substantive provisions 
(trustworthiness, materiality, more probative, and interests of justice), some 
members of the Committee are concerned that any expansion that increases 
judicial discretion to admit or exclude hearsay will be poorly received by the 
practicing bar and may serve to undermine the categorical exceptions.  It is 
for this reason that the Committee has refused at this point to make any 
change to the more probative requirement in the Rule.  Whether the 
Committee will formally propose the changes to the trustworthiness, 
materiality, and interests of justice clauses set forth below remains to be seen. 
Rule 807.  Residual Exception 
(a) In General.  Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is 
not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: 
 (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness the court determines, after considering the totality of 
circumstances and any corroborating evidence, that the statement is 
trustworthy; and 
 (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
 (3 2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; 
and 
 
eyewitness”—but this is only to say that the statement is more probative than any other 
available evidence). 
 134. See, e.g., Lakah v. UBS AG, 996 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also supra 
notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 135. See May 7, 2016, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 10. 
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 (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice. 
(b) Notice.  The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing 
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the an 
intent to offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s 
name and address,—including its substance and the declarant’s name—so 
that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.  The notice must be provided 
before the trial or hearing—or during trial or hearing if the court, for good 
cause, excuses a lack of earlier notice. 
Committee Note 
 The amendment has two goals:  (1) to permit somewhat greater use of 
the residual exception than is currently the case in many courts; and (2) to 
amend the notice requirements to include a good cause exception and to 
improve some procedural details. 
 The amendment is not intended to replace the categorical hearsay 
exceptions with a case-by-case approach to hearsay.  But it is intended to 
allow trial courts somewhat more discretion to admit hearsay that the court 
finds to be trustworthy and that is not admissible under other exceptions.  
This greater flexibility is found in the following changes: 
 Untethering the reliability inquiry from the categorical exceptions that 
had been required by the original rule’s reference to “equivalent” 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  The “equivalence” 
standard is unduly constraining, as well as difficult to apply, given the 
varied and different guarantees of reliability found among the 
categorical exceptions (and given the fact that some hearsay exceptions, 
e.g., Rule 804(b)(6), are not based on reliability at all).  Experience has 
shown that residual hearsay often cannot be compared usefully to any 
of the categorical exceptions and yet might well be trustworthy. 
 Specifically allowing the court to consider the presence or absence of 
corroborating evidence in the reliability inquiry.  Most courts do allow 
consideration of corroborating circumstances, though some do not.  The 
amendment provides for a more uniform and flexible approach and 
recognizes that the existence or absence of corroboration is relevant to 
whether the hearsay statement is accurate. 
 Deleting the requirements that residual hearsay must be evidence of a 
material fact and that its admission will best serve the purposes of the 
rules and the interests of justice.  These requirements are superfluous in 
that they are also found in other rules (e.g., 102, 401).  They have served, 
if anything, as tone setters to indicate that the rule is to be employed 
only in rare and exceptional circumstances.  The amendment is intended 
to allow the use of the exception somewhat more frequently. 
 The legislative history of the original rule indicated that use of the 
residual exception should be left for “rare and exceptional” cases.  That 
phrase in the legislative history has led some courts to exclude proffered 
hearsay because it is not “exceptional.”  The word “exceptional’ is not in 
the text of the rule, and it should not be a word that is used to exclude 
otherwise trustworthy and necessary hearsay.  At any rate, the “rare and 
exceptional” language is no longer descriptive of the rule as amended. 
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 The rule requires the court to determine whether the hearsay statement 
is trustworthy.  In doing so, the court should not consider the credibility of 
a witness who relates the declarant’s hearsay statement in court.  The 
credibility of an in-court witness does not present a hearsay question.  “To 
base admission or exclusion of a hearsay statement on the witness’s 
credibility would usurp the jury’s role of determining the credibility of 
testifying witnesses.”136 
 The Committee decided to retain the requirement that the proponent 
must show that the hearsay statement is more probative than any other 
evidence that can be reasonably obtained.  This necessity requirement will 
continue to serve to prevent the residual exception from being used as a 
device to erode the categorical exceptions. 
 The notice provision has been amended to make four changes in the 
operation of the rule: 
 First, the rule requires the proponent to disclose the “substance” of the 
statement.  This term is intended to require a description that is 
sufficiently specific under the circumstances to allow the opponent a 
fair opportunity to meet the evidence.137  Prior case law on the 
obligation to disclose the “particulars” of the hearsay statement may be 
instructive, but not dispositive, of the proponent’s obligation to disclose 
the “substance” of the statement under the rule as amended. 
 Second, the prior requirement that the declarant’s address must be 
disclosed has been deleted.  That requirement was nonsensical when the 
declarant was unavailable and unnecessary in the many cases in which 
the declarant’s address was known or easily obtainable.  If prior 
disclosure of the declarant’s address is critical and cannot be obtained 
by the opponent through other means, then the opponent can seek relief 
from the court. 
 Third, the rule now requires that the notice be in writing—which 
includes notice in electronic form.138  Requiring the notice to be in 
writing provides certainty and reduces arguments about whether notice 
was actually provided. 
 Finally, the pretrial notice provision has been amended to provide for a 
good cause exception—the same exception found in Rule 404(b).  Most 
courts have applied a good cause exception under Rule 807 even though 
it was not specifically provided in the original rule, while some courts 
have not.  Experience under the residual exception has shown that a 
good cause exception is necessary in certain limited situations.  For 
example, the proponent may not become aware of the existence of the 
hearsay statement until after the trial begins; or the proponent may plan 
to call a witness who without warning becomes unavailable during trial, 
and the proponent must then resort to residual hearsay.  Where notice is 
provided during the trial, the general requirement that notice must be in 
writing need not be met. 
 
 136. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
 137. Cf. id. 103(a)(2) (requiring the party making an offer of proof to inform the court of 
the “substance” of the evidence). 
 138. See id. 101(b)(6). 
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 The rule retains the requirement that the opponent receive notice in a 
way that provides a fair opportunity to meet the evidence.  When notice is 
provided during trial after a finding of good cause, the court may need to 
consider protective measures, such as a continuance, to assure that the 
opponent has time to prepare for the particularized argument that is 
necessary to counter hearsay offered under the residual exception. 
VII.  MIGHT AN AMENDMENT BE JUSTIFIED 
EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEFINITIVE EMPIRICAL SHOWING 
THAT RELIABLE HEARSAY IS BEING EXCLUDED? 
As suggested above, the case digests can be read to support the proposition 
that the residual exception is being applied in such a way that reliable hearsay 
is being excluded—even though the goal of the exception was to admit 
reliable hearsay.  But even if the case digests do not fully answer the question 
of whether an expansion of the residual exception is “necessary,” an 
amendment might well be supportable on the basic grounds of good 
rulemaking. 
The following changes to the rule could be justified as improving the 
operation of the rule and providing uniformity: 
(1) Deleting the equivalence requirement, for all the reasons stated above.  
That change does not necessarily result in an “expansion” of the exception.  
Rather it just allows courts to tackle the trustworthiness question head-on, 
without trying to compare what is often incomparable. 
(2) Amending the trustworthiness requirement to specify that 
corroboration (as well as its absence) must be considered.  This change would 
rectify a conflict among the courts and would not necessarily result in any 
expansion of the exception (especially since most courts already consider 
corroboration to be a relevant consideration). 
(3) Deleting the requirements of materiality and interests of justice, for all 
the reasons stated above.  Of course, one reason for deleting these 
requirements is that they were added by Congress to give a signal, so deleting 
them would probably give the opposite signal.  But independent of the 
signaling effect, there is every justification for deleting these requirements 
because they are superfluous and, in the case of the interests of justice 
requirement, a possible invitation to unwarranted judicial discretion instead 
of a meaningful review of the hearsay’s trustworthiness. 
(4) Adding a paragraph to the Committee Note to instruct that the 
credibility of the witness is not part of the reliability inquiry would promote 
uniformity and is not particularly related to any expansion of the residual 
exception. 
(5) Adding a paragraph to the Committee Note instructing that the “rare 
and exceptional” language is not part of the Rule itself would help to prevent 
courts from trying to use “exceptional” as an admissibility requirement, when 
the test should be whether the hearsay is trustworthy (but unlike the other 
possible changes discussed, it must be admitted that a negative comment on 
this iconic phrase might be interpreted as a signal that the exception is 
expanded). 
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(6) Amending the notice provision has nothing to do with expanding the 
exception itself.139 
In sum, it would be useful to go forward with most or all of the proposed 
amendments to Rule 807, even if the case for expanding the exception to 
cover more hearsay is still subject to argument.  The difference would be in 
the Committee Note. 
A “nonexpansion” “good rulemaking” Committee Note might look 
something like this140: 
 Rule 807 has been amended to fix a number of problems that the courts 
have encountered in applying the rule. 
 Courts have had difficulty with the requirement that the proffered 
hearsay carry “equivalent” circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  
The “equivalence” standard is difficult to apply given the varied and 
different guarantees of reliability found among the categorical exceptions 
(as well as the fact that some hearsay exceptions, e.g., Rule 804(b)(6), are 
not based on reliability at all).  Experience has shown that residual hearsay 
often cannot be compared usefully to any of the categorical exceptions and 
yet might well be trustworthy.  Thus the requirement of an equivalence 
analysis has been abrogated.  Under the amendment, the court is to proceed 
directly to a determination of whether the hearsay is trustworthy under the 
particular circumstances. 
 The amendment specifically allows the court to consider corroborating 
evidence in the reliability inquiry.  Most courts do allow consideration of 
corroborating circumstances, though some do not.  This provision provides 
for a more uniform approach and recognizes that the existence or absence 
of corroboration is relevant to whether a statement is true. 
 The legislative history of the original rule indicated that use of the 
residual exception should be left for “rare and exceptional” cases.  That 
phrase in the legislative history has led some courts to exclude proffered 
hearsay because it is not “exceptional.”  The word “exceptional” is not in 
the text of the rule, and it should not be used to exclude otherwise 
trustworthy hearsay. 
 The rule requires the court to determine whether the hearsay statement 
is trustworthy.  In doing so, the court should not consider the credibility of 
a witness who relates the declarant’s hearsay statement in court.  The 
credibility of an in-court witness does not present a hearsay question.  To 
base admission or exclusion of a hearsay statement on the witness’s 
credibility would usurp the jury’s role of determining the credibility of 
testifying witnesses. 
 
 139. Amending the more probative requirement to focus on the declarant, not on all other 
evidence, could also be supported as good rulemaking because a focus on other available 
evidence ignores the fact that the proponent often needs the hearsay for an effective 
presentation despite (or together with) the available evidence from third parties.  But it is also 
undeniable that amending the more probative requirement to allow in more hearsay would be 
an expansion of the exception, which some would find troubling. 
 140. The Note with respect to the notice provisions would be the same and so is not 
replicated here. 
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CONCLUSION 
The time has come to improve Rule 807.  Currently it results in unjustified 
exclusions of reliable and necessary hearsay, while not doing a very good job 
of tethering judicial discretion or preventing inconsistent results.  The most 
important change to be made is to allow the courts to proceed directly to an 
evaluation of trustworthiness, unimpeded by the distracting factors of 
“equivalence” to the standard exceptions or an inquiry into whether the 
hearsay is “exceptional.”  The other changes proposed would make the Rule 
easier to apply and would resolve conflicts in the courts.  Finally, while the 
extensive case law under Rule 807 supports a call for a limited expansion to 
the Rule, the changes proposed can, for the most part, be justified simply as 
good rulemaking. 
 
